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This "security" to the defendant need only consist of some form of
assurance to the court that the plaintiff will perform his obligation. In
Zelleken v. Lynch, 4 the court found that the plaintiff's expenditure of
a considerable sum in developing the leases in question was satisfactory
proof of his intention to perform. Sometimes the fact that the plaintiff
has elected to bring suit is considered sufficient.1 5 This consideration is
of less magnitude, however, in the principal case, as the contemplated
performance is concurrent. In this situation a conditional decree affords
adequate protection to the defendant.16 Under such a decree, the plain-
tiff's right is made contingent upon his continued performance, and the
defendant is fully protected. J. R. E.
EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE - HUSBAND AND WIFE - GENERAL INCOM-
PETENCY TO TESTIFY AGAINST EACH OTHER IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Defendant was indicted and found guilty of cutting with intent to
wound one Delia Wright. The trial court, over defendant's objection,
permitted his wife to testify against him as a witness for the state. From
the action of the trial court overruling a motion for a new trial, defend-
ant prosecuted appeal. In reversing the conviction and remanding the
cause, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, applying the perti-
nent statute.' found the language to "exclude the possibility of con-
struing it as implying an intention to clothe the wife with a general
competency as a witness against her husband."'
The Ohio statute provides in part: "No person shall be disqualified
as a witness in a criminal prosecution by reason of his interest in the
event thereof as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of
crime. Husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to testify in
behalf of each other in all criminal prosecutions, and to testify against
each other in all actions, prosecutions, and proceedings for personal
injury of either by the other . . . ", It is well settled that the removal
1 Supra, note 13.
1" Philadelphia Ball Club v. Laioie, supra, note 13.
16 Gt. Lakes & St. Louis Transportation Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 5Sz C.C.A. 437,
239 Fed. 603 (1917); Elk Refining Co. v. Falling Rock Cannel Coal Co., 9z W. Va.
479, 5I5 S.E. 431 (192z); Fuchs v. Motor Stage Inc., 6z Ohio App. 20 (939); z A.L.I.
Restatement of Contracts, § 372, comment.
1 Ohio G.C. sec. 13444-2.
' State v. Goodin, 6o Ohio App. 362, 14 Ohio Op. 244, z8 Ohio L. Abs. 4zI (1939).
a Ohio G.C., supra, note x.
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of the common law disqualification of interest does not render husband
and wife competent witnesses for or against each other.4
While the statute expressly provides for testimony in behalf of the
spouse in a criminal case, it is singularly silent as to the general compe-
tency of one spouse to testify against the other. Applying the rule of
construction adopted in State v. Orth the court in the principal case
concluded that the legislature impliedly manifested an intent not to
disturb the spouse's general incompetency except as specifically modified
by the statute.6
It is arguable that this factual situation is covered by the later pro-
vision in the statute, which reads: "Husband or wife shall not testify
concerning a communication made by one to the other, or act (italics
added) done by either in the presence of the other during coverture,
unless the communication was made or act done in the known presence
or hearing of a third person competent to be a witness . . . ".. What
authority there is in this state negatives this suggestion,8 on the basis
that this clause was not meant to enlarge the specific exceptions to a
spouse's general incompetency in such cases.
Though for the purposes of the principal case it was not necessary
to decide, it is not at all clear what position the Ohio courts will take
when the issue is confined to a question of whether this "general incom-
petency" is a rule of privilege or of qualification. For three hundred
years it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the
public has a right to every man's evidence. 9 This right is subject to
two general exceptions-witness disqualification and witness privilege.
In the abstract, they are easily distinguishable. A witness who is dis-
qualified is not permitted to testify.10 A witness who is privileged is not
compelled to testify, but may do so if the exemption be waived by the
proper party.'1
With respect to our particular problem, the common law rule has
always been stated to be that neither party to a marriage is a competent
'Johnson v. U. S., 2z2 Fed. 250, 137 C.C.A. xo6 (19x); Barber v. Goddard, 9
Gray (Ma,3.) 71 (1857)5 Hasbrouch v. Vandervoort, 9 N. Y. 153 ('853); Ex parte
Bville, sS Fla. 170, 5o So. 685, 19 Ann. Cas. 48, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 273 (1909).
79 Ohio St. 13o, S6 N.E. 476, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 24o (19o8).
State v. Payton, zo Ohio Dec. Rep. 8z6, a' Cinc. L. Bull. 337 (1889); in accord,
Uinr v. State, 157 Nlis. 807, 128 So. 749 (1930); State v. Herbert, 92 N. J. Law 34!,
IO5 Ad. 796 (1918).
'Ohio G.C., supra, note i.
Rosser v. State, Io Ohio L. Abs. 69 (193).
W V sr, TREATLE oN LAw oF EIDENCE, (ad Ed. 1923) sec. a19a; Lathrop v.
Clapp, 40 N. Y. 32S, zoo Am. DCc. 493 (1869); Ex parte Barnes, 73 Tex. Crim. 583,
166, S.W. 728, Si L.R.A. (N.S.) 115 (1914); In Re Davies, 168 N.Y. 89, 6 N.E. 1iS,
s6 L.R.A. 85 (1901).
. McKELvEy, HAND)BOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDECE, (4 th Ed. 1932) sec. 245.
"Ibid.
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witness in favor or against the other,12 save in a few exceptional cases
in which their testimony is held admissible on the ground of necessity.' 3
As a general principle this sufficed in most instances. There was no
occasion for further analysis-to decide whether anti-marital testimony
was a disqualifying factor or a matter of privilege.
Clearly, at common law a favorably testifying spouse was disquali-
fied. 4 The exclusion was absolute; the consent of neither spouse could
have made the other competent. Coupled as it generally was in state-
ment with this disqualification, it was but natural that many courts
considered an adverse testifying spouse to be disqualified." The better
reasoned authority, however, supports the privileged character of such
testimony. 6 Historically, the latter approach seems to be on firm
ground. The privileged nature of this testimony was recognized some
time prior in point of time to its association by Lord Coke in 1628 with
the disqualification.' Logically dissimilar policies underlie the two rules.
The rationale for the disqualification is the danger of false testimony;
for the privilege, marital dissension and a natural repugnance of com-
pelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other's condemnation.' 8
The Ohio courts previous to the enactment of the first statutory
modification followed the general rule as to the spouse's general incom-
petency.' Nor are there any decisions as to the real character of this
"incompetency." There is dictum in a comparatively recent appellate
case,
20 however, that indicates that this common law incompetency
could not be waived.
12 COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON, 6 b. (16z8) i Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209,
so U. S. (L. Ed.) 129 (1839); Wilke v. People, 53 N. Y. 5z5, I Cow. Cr. 541 (1873);
Burlen v. Shannon, 14 Gray (Mass.) 433 (186o).
Is BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, (1765) I, p. 443; Butler v. Phillips, 38 Cola. 378,
88 Pac. 480, sz Ann. Cas. 204 (19o6); State v. Kodat, 158 Mo. IZS, 59 S.V. 73, SI
Am. St. Rep. 292, 51 L.R.A. 509 (9oo); Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio St. 87, 32 Am. Rep.
359 (1877).
14WIOMORE, supra, note 9, sec. 604 comments: "There cannot be the slightest doubt
upon the principle, but the few rulings are not satisfactory, partly owing to the usual
statutory regulation, in the same section of both the disqualification and the privilege, the
language of the one being in truth inappropriate for the other." See Barbat v. Allen,
7 Exch. 6o9 (zSz) (waiver not allowed, because the consent was not given till after the
judge's rule of exclusion. Quaere: Suppose consent had been given in time.); Falk v.
Witham, izo Cal. 479, 52 Pac. 707 (1898) (incapacity of the other spouse to consent
does not allow an examination).
" Barber v. People, 203 I11. 543, 68 N.E. 93 (1903); Brock v. State, 44 Tex. Cr.
335, 71 S.W. 20 (19oz); Davis v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. Z9Z, 77 S.W. 451 (1903).
" Pedley v. Wellesley, 3 C. & P. 5s8 (5829); People v. Chadwick, 4 Cal. App. 63,
87 Pac. 384 (r9o6); Benson v. Morgan, So Mich. 77, 14 N.W. 705 (xS83); GReENs-
LEAF, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, (i6th Ed. 1899) sec. 333e.
"
7 Anon., I Brownlow 47 (1613)-
. WirMORE, supra, note 9, sec. 2228.
"Steen v. State, zo Ohio St. 333 (1870); Schult. v. State, 32 Ohio St. 276 (1877);
Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio St. 87, 32 Am. Rep. 359 (1877); State v. Smith, 7 Ohio N.P.
7z, 9 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 749 (1898).
=° Locke v. State, 33 Ohio App. 44S, 169 N.E. 833, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 653 (1929).
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Under the present statute21 and its immediate predecessors, whose
provisions for our purposes are the same, the question remains unan-
swered. It presents a vexatious problem, particularly in view of the
absence of Ohio common law authority on the point.
It is certainly arguable that the very absence of statutory reference
to anti-marital testimony reflects the intention of the legislature to
retain the common law rule.2" If so, we have reached a stalemate,
except for such dicta as referred to earlier. That same case2" continues
as to the effect of the statute: "The spouse is no longer absolutely
incompetent. Husband or wife may testify for each other, and this
partial competency makes it possible for the accused to waive the com-
petency of such witness when called by the state." However irrational
this approach may seem, it is fairly apparent that the court is seeking
to declare this a privilege.
In Ruch v. State2 ' the question was directly in issue. On a trial for
a crime, the wife of accused was called by the state and gave material
testimony, and no objection was made and no motion to exclude was
made during the trial. The court held this to be a waiver of the statutory
provisions and its admission no reversible error. Despite the construction
adopted by the court, the case is not too helpful. Though the wife be
incompetent, still if no objection is made, there is invited error. The
burden is upon defendant to object.
From the standpoint of policy, every consideration supports the
theory that this "incompetency to testify against one's spouse" is a
matter of privilege.
Should we conclude that, as a matter of fact, the Ohio courts look
upon this as a rule of privilege, the one remaining problem is: Whose
is the privilege and who may waive it? If we consult the reason most
commonly advanced in support of the privilege, namely, the prevention
of marital dissension, it would seem to attribute the privilege to the
marital party only, and not to the marital witness. But taking the other
suggested reason for the privilege, namely, immunity from the repug-
nant situation of being condemned by one's spouse, the privilege seems
to be equally that of party and of witness.2"
It has been established in some courts that at least the privilege
belongs to the party spouse against whom the other is offered as a wit-
z Ohio G.C., supra, note x.
State v. Orth, supra, note S.
' Locke v. State, supra, note zo.
z x Ohio St. 58o, 146 N.E. 67 (1924).
5 WIGNIORE, supra, note 9, sec. 2z4i ; see 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 863.
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ness.2" Rarely is the privilege denied to belong to the witness spouse.2"
And rarely also is it denied to belong to the party spouse."
Though to assume from the present state of the cases that the Ohio
courts will construe this general incompetency to testify against one's
spouse to be a privilege may seem somewhat radical, the definite trend
throughout the country is certainly in this direction. In line with this,
the most acceptable means of clarifying the irresolution resulting from
the clumsily worded statute is by legislative enactment specifically pro-
viding that anti-marital testimony is privileged.
R. G. T.
EVIDENCE - RES GESTAE - HEARSAY RULE -
SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS
Res Gestae is the "lurking place of a motley crowd of conceptions
in mutual conflict and reciprocating chaos . . . the conflict and the
chaos will not cease until the various conceptions concealed beneath the
ample wings of the res gestae are released from a coverture as alien to
most of them as the nest from which the mis-laid cuckoo first surveys
the world."' The use of the term res gestae and its application to the
field of evidence by Lord Ellenborough in 1805 was more or less of
an historical accident.' It has come down since i8o 5 through custom
or habit and is used as a reason for permitting many varieties of subject
matter to be placed in evidence. It is one of the most ubiquitous phrases
in the law' and is perhaps used most frequently in the law of evidence.
This note is limited to an analysis of the use of res gestae in that field.
"6 Ward v. Dickson, 96 Ia. 708, 65 N.W. 997 (1896) ; People v. Gordon, ioo Mich.
Si8, 5zo, sg N.W. 322 (1894.); Liks v. Lihs, 44 Neb. 143, 62 N.V. 457 (1895).
"' Turner v. State, 6o Miss. 351 (1882) (assault and battery on the wife the wife
compellable to testify, though unwilling, the husband not having a privilege).
"State v. Geer, 48 Kan. 752, 754, 30 PaC. 236 (1892) (the wife may consent,
though not compellable, to testify against husband); Corn. v. Baronian, 235 Mass. 364,
126 N. E. 833 (192o); Com. v. Barker, 185 Mass. 324, 70 N.E. 203 (1904).
'Stone, Res Gestae Reagitata (939) 55 Law Q. Rev. 66.
' The first use of the plural term, res gestae, by a judge is believed to be in the
opinion given by Lord Ellenborough in Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East 1SS, 193-194 (18o),
wherein he referred to Thompson v. Trevanion, Skinner 402 (1694), as holding admis-
sible "as part of the res gestae" certain statements made by an injured person imme-
diately after an assault. As a matter of fact, there was no reference made to any such
term as res gestae in Lord Holt's opinion in Thompson v. Trevanion. Prior to 18o5 the
singular form res gesta had been used several times in judicial reports. See Thayer, Bed-
ingfield's Case, xS Am. L. Rev. 5, 8, for a history of the terms res gesta and res gestae.
'See 3 WIoMoRp, EviDvrcE (7d ed. 1923) secs. 1768-1769. To establish liability
for acts of agent: 2 MEcuEse on Aormcy, (2d ed. 1914) secs. 1781-1785 and ses. 1793-
1799; Thomas v. Hargrave, Wright's Rep. (Ohio, 1834) 95. To establish liability for
acts of co-conspirator: Clawson v. State, 14 Ohio St. 234 (1863), Hutchinson v. State,
8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 313, 18 Ohio C.D. 595 (i9o6).
